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I.
Introduction
A reoccurring and divisive issue in the debate over food safety in the United
States is whether the government should have the authority to order companies to recall
unsafe food from commerce.2 Recent events have renewed interest in the debate: the
discovery of the mad cow disease in Washington State, leading to the recall of beef
products that may have been exposed to tissues containing the agent that causes bovine
spongiform encephalopathy (BSE);3 well-publicized, large-scale recall failures,4 the
threat of bioterrorism’s introducing harmful bacteria and toxins into the food chain;5 and,
finally, an overall increasing concern about the safety of food in the United States.6
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For example, on December 12, 2002, the United States Department of Agriculture Food Safety and
Inspection Service held a public meeting on the topic of “Improving the Recall Process.” The meeting
included a lively discussion on the implications of mandatory recall authority. Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS), Transcript of Proceedings: Improving the Recall Process, Wash. D.C. (Dec. 12, 2002).
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See USDA Revises State Count on BSE Recall; Says More Than 500 Firms Have Been Notified, 6 FOOD
CHEMICAL NEWS (2004) (describing how consumer groups are using the BSE incidents as another
opportunity to call for mandatory recall).
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See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, GREAT
PLAINS REGIONAL AUDIT REPORT 24601-2-KC, FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE OVERSIGHT OF
PRODUCTION PROCESS AND RECALL AT CONAGRA PLANT (ESTABLISHMENT 969) (2003) (highly critical of
government’s role in the recall of beef products in 2002 involving ConAgra).
5

See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BIOTERRORISM: A THREAT TO AGRICULTURE AND
THE FOOD SUPPLY (2003) (summary of threat of bioterrorism to United States food supply).
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For a recently published best-selling book criticizing the modern food industry and the overall safety of
food, see ERIC SCHLOSSER, FAST FOOD NATION (2002). For other similarly postured books, see MOLLY
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Currently, the government does not have the authority to mandate a recall of unsafe food;
recalls of unsafe food products are voluntarily conducted by food companies and are
monitored by government agencies.7 This contrasts with the authority that government
has to order a recall for many non-food products.8
Defenders of the current voluntary food recall system contend that the
government has sufficient enforcement authority and that mandatory recall authority
would undermine the cooperative arrangement that exists between government and
private industry.9 Proponents of mandatory recall authority believe that the voluntary
recall system does not meet the challenges and needs of the modern food production
industry and that in order to protect public health, the government should be armed with
mandatory recall authority such as it has for other non-food products.10 Defenders of the
current voluntary recall system include members and representatives of the food
industry;11 supporters of a mandatory recall system include consumer advocacy groups12
and, interestingly enough, most recently the American Farm Bureau.13

IVINS, BUSHWACKED 125 –147 (2003); MARION NESTLE, SAFE FOOD: BACTERIA, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND
BIOTERRORISM (2003).
7

See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/RCED-00-195, FOOD SAFETY: ACTIONS NEEDED BY USDA
AND FDA TO ENSURE THAT COMPANIES PROMPTLY CARRY OUT RECALLS (2000), at 3.
8

See, e.g., Consumer Protection Safety Act (CPSA) 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (1998) (empowering the Consumer
Protection Safety Commission to order recalls of consumer products).
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See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 178-182, 190-201.
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See, e.g., Caroline Smith DeWaal, Statement at the FSIS Public Meeting Improving the Recall Process,
Wash. D.C. (Dec. 12, 2002).
11

Notable food industry representatives supportive of the current voluntary recall system include the
National Food Processors Association and the National Meat Association. See USDA Mandatory Recall?
“Why Fix Something That is Not Broken?” MEAT INDUSTRY INTERNET NEWS SERVICE (Oct. 7, 1997), at
www.spcnet.com/mii/1997/971029 (comments by Kelley Johnston, NFPA’s Vice President of
Government Affairs and Communications, in testimony to the Senate Agriculture Committee); see also
National Meat Association, Comments Before the Senate Agriculture Committee, Oct. 8, 1997, available at
http://www.nmaonline.org/files/pr10-8.htm.
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This article examines this debate in four parts. Part one explains the need for an
effective recall system to protect consumers from foodborne illnesses. Part two examines
the current voluntary food recall system, including its basis, form, and rationale. Part
three notes the criticism of the voluntary recall system, fueled by the failure of large-scale
recalls, and proposed mandatory recall legislation that was developed in direct response
to these recall failures. Part four recommends, in the event that mandatory recall
authority is extended to the government, essential components for an effective mandatory
food recall system and summarizes its potential benefits.
This article concludes that the granting of mandatory recall authority to
government with appropriate safeguards is a sensible, minimalist approach to the
protection of public health. It is sensible because mandatory recall authority would
improve a recall system that generally works fairly well but has also experienced
significant breakdowns leading to severe criticism of the food industry and the
government agencies responsible for monitoring the voluntary recall system. These
improvements include expediting the removal of unsafe food from commerce, providing
essential insurance against the bad-actor food company, strengthening the government’s
hand against bioterrorism, enhancing consumer confidence in food, aligning incentives
for food companies to protect consumers against unsafe food, reducing liability exposure
of food companies, and creating a more rational food recall system in the context of
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Representative consumer advocates groups supportive of a mandatory food recall system include Safe
Tables Our Priority (S.T.O.P.) and the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI). To view these
groups’ respective Web sites and positions on food recall, see http://www.safetables.org;
http://www.cspinet.org/.
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See AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N, FARM BUREAU POLICIES FOR 2004 (2004), at 39 (adopting the following
resolution: “[w]e support granting the Secretary of Agriculture authority to impose mandatory quarantine
and recall of meat products based on scientific testing and detection procedures.”).
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domestic and international food safety policy. It is a minimalist approach because, with
appropriate safeguards in place, mandatory recall authority should not undermine the
current cooperative recall culture existing between government and private industry.
Food companies would continue to have incentives to voluntarily recall their unsafe food
without undue concern of government overreach.
II.
Need for an Effective Food Recall System
While the United States is generally regarded as having the safest food supply in
the world,14 foodborne illness caused by consuming contaminated foods or beverages is a
compelling public health problem: the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
estimates that foodborne diseases cause approximately 76 million illnesses, 325,000
hospitalizations, and 5,000 deaths annually.15

Compounding the problem is the

constantly changing nature of foodborne illness.16 While improvements in food safety,
such as pasteurization and proper canning, have all but eliminated some diseases,17 new
foodborne infections have emerged. Today there are more than 250 different foodborne
diseases, most of which are infections, caused by a variety of bacteria, viruses, and
parasites.18

The most commonly recognized foodborne infections are those caused by

14

See ECONOMIC RESEARCH SERVICE, USDA BRIEFING ROOM, GOVERNMENT FOOD SAFETY POLICIES,
available at http://www.ers.usda.gov/Briefing/FoodSafetyPolicy/.
15

See Paul S. Mead, et al., Food-Related Illness and Death in the United States, 5 EMERGING INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 607 (1999), available at http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol5no5/mead.htm.
16

See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, FOODBORNE ILLNESS, at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/foodborneinfections_g.htm.
17

See id.

18

See id. The other type of foodborne diseases is poisonings, caused by harmful toxins or chemicals that
have contaminated the food. See id.
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the bacteria E. coli 0157:H7, 19 Salmonella,20 Listeria,21 and Campylobacter,22 and by a
group called calicivirus, also known as the Norwalk viruses.23

19

An estimated 73,000 cases of infection and 61 deaths occur in the United States each year from
Escherichia coli 0157:H7. The organism lives in the intestines of healthy cattle. It was first recognized as
a cause of illness in 1982 during an outbreak of severe bloody diarrhea that was traced to contaminated
hamburgers. Human illness from E. coli 0157:H7 follows consumption of food or water that has been
contaminated with cow feces. Most infections occur from eating undercooked ground beef. The illness it
causes is often a severe and bloody diarrhea and painful abdominal cramps. It can cause temporary anemia,
profuse bleeding, and kidney failure. See id. See also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL , ESCHERICHIA
COLI 0157:H7, ,at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/escherichiacoli_g.htm#What%20is%20Escherichia%20coli%
20O157:H7.
20

Each year 40,000 cases of Salmonella are reported in the United States. Because many milder cases are
not diagnosed or reported, the actual number of infections may be much higher. Salmonella is a bacterium
that is widespread in the intestines of birds, reptiles, and mammals. It can spread to humans from a variety
of different foods of animal origin. It causes salmonellosis, which includes fever, diarrhea, and abdominal
cramps. With persons most vulnerable, such as the elderly, infants, and those with impaired immune
systems, it can be life-threatening. It is estimated that 600 people die each year with acute Salmonella. See
Mead, supra, note 15. See also CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, SALMONELLOSIS, at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/salmonellaosis_g.htm#What%20is%20salmonellaosis. In
November of 2003, the USDA announced that the rate of Salmonella in raw meat and poultry dropped by
sixty-six percent (66%) over the past six years and by sixteen percent (16%) in 2003 compared with 2002.
USDA attributed the drop in reported Salmonella to strong, science-based enforcement of food safety rules.
See USDA Press Release, Tests Show Salmonella in Meat and Poultry Products Declines 66 Percent,
available at http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/2003/11/0396.htm.
21

An estimated 2,500 persons become seriously ill with listeriosis each year, and of this number, 500
persons die. Listeria monocytogenes is found in soil and water. Uncooked vegetables, meats, processed
foods, and unpasteurized dairy products may contain the bacterium. Listeria may be killed by cooking;
however, in certain ready-to-eat foods such as hot dogs and deli meats, contamination may occur after
cooking but before packaging. Listeria primarily affects pregnant women, newborns, and adults with
weakened immune systems. Listeria causes fever, muscle aches, and sometimes-gastrointestinal symptoms
such as nausea or diarrhea. See CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, LISTERIA, at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/listeriosis_g.htm#symptoms. In October of 2003, USDA
announced a one-year, twenty-five percent (25%) drop in positive Listeria monocytogenes samples and a
seventy percent (70%) decline compared with years prior to the implementation of the Hazard Analysis and
Critical Control Points (HACCP) system. See FSIS News Release, Listeria in FSIS Ready-to-Eat Products
Shows Significant Decline, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/news/2003/rtedata.htm.
22

Campylobacter is estimated to affect over one million people in the United States every year, or 0.5% of
the population. Most cases go undiagnosed or unreported. It is estimated that 100 persons with
Campylobacter infections will die each year. Campylobacter is a bacterial pathogen that causes fever,
diarrhea, and abdominal cramps. It is the most commonly identified bacterial cause of diarrheal illness in
the world. These bacteria live in the intestines of healthy birds, and most raw poultry meat has
Campylobacter on it. Eating undercooked chicken or other food that has been contaminated with juices
dripping from raw chicken is the most frequent source of this infection. See Mead, supra note 15. See also
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL, CAMPYLOBACTER INFECTIONS, at
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dbmd/diseaseinfo/campylobacter_g.htm#What%20is%campylobacteriosis.
23

Norwalk-like virus is an extremely common form of foodborne illness, though rarely diagnosed. It
causes an acute gastrointestinal illness, usually with more vomiting than diarrhea that resolves itself after a
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Foodborne illness outbreaks are also becoming increasingly widespread and
complicated. The classic outbreak of foodborne illness was confined to a local
community, generally caused by a catered meal or a potluck dinner.24 Changes in the
way food is prepared and consumed today25 cause foodborne illness outbreaks to affect
many persons in many different places, spread out over long periods of time.26
To protect consumers from these foodborne illnesses, unsafe food products must
be removed quickly and efficiently from commerce.27 Food safety is, of course, ideally
achieved by ensuring that recalls need not occur in the first place;28 however, once unsafe
food enters commerce, recalls are a critical tool for protecting the health and lives of
consumers.29
III.
Overview of the Current
Voluntary Food Recall System
The current voluntary food recall system is marked by a unique food safety
regulatory approach that allocates responsibilities to two government agencies that in turn

few days. Unlike many foodborne pathogens that have animal reservoirs, Norwalk-like viruses spread
primarily from one infected person to another, such as kitchen workers who contaminate a salad or
sandwich as they prepare it. See Mead, supra note 15.
24

See id.

25

These changes include first, the increasing consumption of a greater variety of foods, particularly
seafood, fresh fruits, and vegetables that are eaten raw; second, the dramatic increase in the variety of foods
imported from all over the world; and, third, the increasingly number of people eating more of their meals
away from home. See Joseph A. Levitt, FDA’s Foods Program, 56 FOOD DRUG L.J. 255, 255-256 (2001).

26

See id.

27

See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE,
THE RECALL WORKING GROUP (Aug. 10, 1998), available at

http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/programs/recallwg.htm.
28

See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 10.

29

See id.
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develop oversight procedures and protocol for voluntary food recalls conducted by
private companies.
A.

Dual Agency Responsibility for Food Recall

The two government agencies charged with food recall responsibility are the
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA).30 USDA derives its regulatory authority from the Meat Inspection Act31 and the
Poultry Products Inspection Act,32 giving it responsibility for the regulation of meat,
poultry, and certain egg products. USDA administers a food safety and inspection
program over these products through its branch agency, the Food Safety and Inspection
Service (FSIS).33 FDA derives its regulatory power from various laws including the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 34 giving it responsibility for the regulation of all
other food products, including whole (or shell) eggs, sea food, milk, grain products, fruits
and vegetables, and certain canned, frozen, and otherwise packaged foods containing
meat, poultry, and eggs that are not regulated by USDA.35

30

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 5.

31

21 U.S.C. § 601(1999).

32

See id. at §§ 451-469 (1999).

33

See 7 C.F.R. § 2.53 (2004) (describing various FSIS responsibilities).

34

21 U.S.C. § 392(a) (1999).

35

The distinctions between food products regulated by USDA and FDA are often confusing. For example,
FDA regulates the safety of egg shells, while USDA regulates processed egg products, except for certain
processed egg products. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 1033(f), 1034(a), 1052(c) (1999); 7 C.F.R. § 55.2 (2004)
(definition of “egg product”). See generally Michael R. Taylor, Preparing America’s Food Safety System
for the Twenty-First Century—Who Is Responsible for What When It Comes to Meeting the Food Safety
Challenges of the Consumer-Driven Global Economy? 52 FOOD DRUG L.J. 13, 18-19 (1997) (addressing
the fragmented federal food safety system).
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This food safety regulatory regime for USDA and FDA prohibits the adulteration
and misbranding of food.36 Implementing regulations and policy statements define
adulteration and misbranding, and USDA and FDA enforce these provisions when
violations are encountered.37 An important tool used by USDA and FDA in the
enforcement of these provisions is the recall of food.38
B.

Basis for Voluntary Recall: the Implicit Threat

Despite the importance of recall as an enforcement tool, neither USDA nor FDA
has statutory authority to mandate a recall.39 Recalls administered by USDA and FDA is
strictly voluntary.40 What then triggers a voluntary recall? What leverage does the
USDA or FDA have to motivate companies to voluntarily recall their food product?41
36

See 21 U.S.C. §§ 402, 453(g)(3), and 601(m)(3) (1999).

37

The basic legal standard for what constitutes adulterated food is the same under the Federal Food, Drug,
and Cosmetic Act, the Federal Meat Inspection Act, and the Poultry Products Inspection Act. Generally
speaking, the regulatory statutes establish four adulteration provisions: 1) a food is considered adulterated if
it contains a harmful substance that may pose a safety risk; 2) a food is adulterated if it contains an added
harmful substance that is acquired during production or cannot be reasonably avoided, and it exceeds
applicable tolerance levels; 3) a food is adulterated if it contains a substance that has been intentionally
added to the food but that has not been approved or otherwise sanctioned for use by a regulatory agency or
one of the food safety statutes; and, 4) a food is adulterated if it has been handled under unsanitary
conditions, creating a risk of contamination with a substance that may pose a safety threat. See THE FOOD
INSTITUTE, HACCP & U.S. FOOD SAFETY GUIDE (2d ed.), at sec. 2, at p. 6.
38

See Dr. Garry L. McKee, Food Safety & Inspection Service OIG Audit Report on ConAgra, Washington,
D.C. (Oct. 2, 2003).
39

FSIS plainly states that “[a] food recall is a voluntary action by a manufacturer or distributor to protect
the public from products that may cause health problems or possible death.” FOOD SAFETY AND
INSPECTION SERVICE, BACKGROUNDER/KEY FACTS, FSIS FOOD RECALLS (2002), available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Oabackground/bkrecalls.htm. See also CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED
NUTRITION, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, INDUSTRY AFFAIRS STAFF BROCHURE, FDA RECALL
POLICIES (June 2002), available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/recall2.html.
40

GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 3.

41

Headlines in the news indicate that it is commonly misperceived that food products are subject to
mandatory recall by the government. Examples include “FDA Orders Peanut Butter Recall,” and “FDA
Orders 6,500 Cases of Red-Dyed Mints Recalled.” The headlines are, of course, wrong in indicating that
the Agency can order these recalls. See CENTER FOR FOOD SAFETY AND APPLIED NUTRITION, supra note 39,
available at http://vm.cfsan.fda.gov/~lrd/recall2.html.
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The answer is simple: it is the implicit threat of regulatory action, liability, and adverse
publicity.42
The threat of regulatory action involves an array of regulatory enforcement tools
available to USDA and FDA in varying degree and scope: warning letters,43 adverse
publicity,44 injunction,45 retention,46 seizure,47 and criminal prosecution.48 These
sanctions are not mutually exclusive and may build upon one another.49 Given these

42

See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 20-21.

43

A warning letter from the FDA is a written communication to a company asserting that there has been a
violation of the FDCA or implementing regulations. The letter will typically request that the company
inform the agency about the action the company will take to correct the alleged violation. The warning
letter will generally caution the company that enforcement action may be initiated “without further notice.”
If a company does not correct the violation, further sanctions may be imposed. In contrast to FDA’s
practice, USDA warning letters are sent after the department has decided not to take further regulatory
action. In other words, the warning letter closes the file. See THE FOOD INSTITUTE, supra note 37, at Sec.
2, p.13.

44

Adverse publicity consists of the dissemination of information that the company is not cooperating with
enforcement officials. See 21 U.S.C. § 705 (1999).

45

If FDA or USDA seeks an injunction, they must go to the U.S. Attorney where the company is located.
If the prosecutor agrees to take the case, he or she will file a request for an injunction with the U.S. District
Court. See THE FOOD INSTITUTE, supra note 37, at sec. 2, p.17.

46

USDA retains product when an in-plant inspector places a “tag” on product located at a federally
inspected facility that he or she believes to be adulterated or misbranded. Once tagged, a product cannot be
removed from the facility without USDA approval. In most instances, a product is either reconditioned or
destroyed within a few days. See id. at 15.

47

In a seizure proceeding, the government initially seeks a court order authorizing the United States
Marshall to “seize” the product. A seizure action seeks the destruction of a product, not merely a
prohibition against its shipment. Once seized, the product cannot be moved without the court’s permission.
The government will also file a complaint requesting that the product be “condemned” and destroyed. See
id. at 16.

48

The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA), the Poultry Products Inspection Act (PPIA), and the Federal
Meat Inspection Act (FMIA) have strong criminal provisions that are essentially strict liability statutes: to
obtain a conviction, the government need not establish intent to violate the law. Two types of criminal
violations exist: misdemeanors and felonies. Under FDCA, most food violations are misdemeanors;
however, FDA can request a felony conviction if the government can prove intent to defraud or mislead or
if there has been a prior conviction. Under PPIA and FMIA, any violation involving the distribution or
attempted distribution of an adulterated food is a felony. See id. at 18.

49

See id. at 12.
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regulatory threats, a recall may be the only practical option for a company experiencing a
food safety problem.50
Companies also recall food products to minimize and avoid liability.51 A failure
to recall unsafe food significantly increases a company’s liability exposure and the risk of
class actions and punitive damages.52 Companies also risk adverse publicity that could
destroy their brand image.53 Consequently, some observers deem the term “voluntary”
recall a misnomer since it is compelled by regulatory, legal, and marketing pressures.54
C.

Regulatory Oversight of Voluntary Recall

USDA and FDA oversee, monitor, and coordinate voluntary recall activities.55
USDA procedures for recalls of defective meat are found in an FSIS Directive;56 FDA
procedures for recalls are published in the Code of Federal Regulations.57 These
procedures have been developed into recall programs that USDA, through FSIS, and
FDA employ for the foods they regulate.58 Notwithstanding these recall programs and

50

See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 17-21.

51

See generally John M. Packman, Civil and Criminal Liability Associated with Food Recalls, 53 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 437 (1998).

52

See id.

53

See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 181.

54

See National Meat Association, supra note 11, available at http://www.nmaonline.org/files/pr10-8.htm.

55

See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 5.

56

See UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FSIS INFORMATION CENTER, FSIS DIRECTIVE
8080.1, REV. 3, RECALL OF MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS, available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA.recalls/rec_intr.htm; UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, FSIS
DIRECTIVE, RECALL OF MEAT AND POULTRY PRODUCTS (Jan.19, 2000), available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/frdad/FSISDirectives/8080.1Rev3.htm.
57

See 21 C.F.R. §§ 7.40-.59 (2003).

58

See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 6.
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the presence of the implicit threat, the essence of food recall activity is still voluntary:
companies are not required by law to recall unsafe food,59 and even if companies elect to
voluntarily recall unsafe food, they are not required by law or regulation to notify USDA
or FDA of their recall.60
1.

FSIS Voluntary Recall Program

When FSIS learns that adulterated or misbranded meat or poultry may be in
commerce,61 it conducts a preliminary investigation to determine whether a recall of the
food product is warranted.62 If FSIS determines that a recall is necessary, it convenes a
meeting of its Recall Committee that is comprised FSIS scientists, technical experts, field
inspection managers, enforcement personnel, and communication specialists.63 The
Recall Committee evaluates available information and, based on the health risk of the
food product, categorizes the recall into one of three classes: a Class I recall where a
strong likelihood exists that a product will cause serious adverse health consequences or
death,64 a Class II recall where a remote possibility exists of an adverse health

59

See id.

60

See id. at 7, 11.

61

FSIS can learn about the possibility of unsafe meat from several sources: the company that manufactured
or distributed the meat, test results received by FSIS as part of its sampling program, FSIS field inspectors
and compliance officers, consumer complaints, epidemiological data submitted by state or local public
health departments, and government agencies. See FSIS, REPORT OF THE RECALL WORKING GROUP, supra note
27, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/Oabackground/bkrecalls.htm.
62

The preliminary investigation includes some or all of the following steps: collecting and verifying
information about the inspected food; documenting a chronology of events; contacting the manufacturer of
the food for more information; discussions with FSIS field inspection and compliance personnel;
interviewing a consumer who allegedly became ill or injured from eating the food; collecting and analyzing
food samples; and, contacting state and local health departments. See id.

63

See FSIS DIRECTIVE, supra note 56, available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/rdad/FSISDirectives/8080.1Rev3.htm.
64

An example of a Class I recall would be meat that is contaminated with pathogenic bacteria, such as
Listeria monocytogenes in a ready-to-eat product or Escherichia coli 0157:H7 in raw ground beef. Another
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consequence resulting from consuming the meat or poultry product,65 or a Class III recall
where the consumption of the product will not cause adverse health consequences.66 The
Recall Committee also recommends the depth and scope of the recall.67 FSIS and the
recalling company conduct effectiveness checks to determine the adequacy of notice
about the recall and the success in removing the product.68 FSIS notifies the public of
recalls in two ways: a press release69 and a recall notification report.70 FSIS also posts
recall notification reports on its Web site and sends these reports to food safety and
public health officials throughout the country.71

example includes the adding of Class I allergens, such as peanuts or eggs, as an ingredient in processed
meat without listing them on the label. See FSIS, REPORT OF THE WORKING RECALL GROUP,
supra note 27, available at http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/programs/recallwg.htm.
65

An example of a Class II recall would be the presence of dry milk as an ingredient in sausage without
mention of the dry milk on the label. Another example is the presence of undeclared allergens such as milk
or soy products. See id. The well-publicized Class II recall announced on December 23, 2003, involving
the BSE incident was designated a Class II by the FDA due to an extremely low likelihood that the
products contained the infectious agent that causes BSE. The infected tissues including the brain, spinal
cord, and distal ileum, were all removed from the carcass on the day of slaughter, meaning that the meat
produced were cuts that would not be expected to be infected or have an adverse public health impact. See
FSIS UPDATE OF RECALL ACTIVITIES (Feb. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/recalls/prelease/update067-2003.html.

66

An example of Class III recall would be improperly labeled processed meat in which added water is not
listed on the label as required by the federal regulations. See id.

67

See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 4, at 3.

68

See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 29.

69

In February 2000, USDA began issuing press releases for all three classes of recalls, even if the product
is not identifiable to consumers. See id. at 16, 28. The press release is issued to media outlets in the area
where the product was distributed and to an email list-serv. See FSIS BACKGROUNDER, supra note 39. The
public can request to receive FSIS press releases and other FSIS materials by subscribing to the FSIS
Constituent Update at www.fsis.usda.gov/oa/update/subscribe.asp. The news release is posted on the FSIS
Recall Web site at www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/rec_intr.htm.
70

Recall Notification Reports (RNR) provide the public with detailed information about meat and poultry
recalls. RNRs are sent by facsimile and electronic mail to food safety and public health officials
throughout the country. See id.

71

The RNR are posted on the FSIS Recall Web site at www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/recalls/rec_intr.htm.
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2.

FDA Voluntary Recall Program

When FDA learns that a recall needs to be, will be, or has been initiated,72 the
FDA’s district office73obtains preliminary information about the recall and product and
provides this information to FDA’s Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition
(CFSAN)74 and FDA’s Office of Regulatory Affairs (ORA)75 within 24 hours.76 The
district office may assist the company in developing a recall strategy, although companies
are not required to consult with FDA or modify its recall strategy on the basis of FDA’s
recommendations.77 CFSAN prepares a written health hazard evaluation that is used to
classify the recall into one of three classes:78a Class I recall for dangerous or defective
products that predictably could cause serious health problems or death,79a Class II recall
for products that might cause a temporary health problem or pose only a slight threat of a
serious nature,80 and a Class III recall for situations where eating the food will not cause

72
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adverse consequences.81 FDA monitors the progress of a company’s recall through its
termination.82 FDA encourages the recalling company to issue a press release for Class I
and selected Class II recalls.83 When FDA believes that the public needs to be alerted
about a serious hazard, FDA will issue its own press release.84 FDA also posts an
Enforcement Report on its Web site, listing all food recalls by the agency.85
3.

Market Withdrawal and Stock Recovery

In addition to recalls, other actions may be taken by a food company to remove a
product from commerce, including market withdrawal and stock recovery.86 Market
withdrawal is the removal of a distributed product that involves a minor violation that
would not be subject to legal action by the FDA or FSIS, or when the company wishes to
remove a product from distribution for other reasons, such as when a product does not
meet the company’s internal specifications.87 Stock recovery is the removal of a product
that has not been placed in retail distribution channels but is still under the direct control
of the food company.88
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D.

Policy Rationale for Voluntary Recall

Support for the current voluntary recall system rests on two predicates: first, that
it effectively removes unsafe food products from commerce;89 and second, that it
engenders cooperation between government and industry.90 Defenders of the voluntary
recall system believe that companies have generally initiated recalls without delays,
either on their own initiative or in response to requests to voluntarily do so.91 USDA
officials often comment that there are no instances in which companies delayed or failed
to initiate a recall;92 however, a United States General Accounting Office (GAO) report
questions this claim on the grounds that it is purely anecdotal, since USDA nor FDA
systematically measure the full extent of companies’ recall activities.93 The same GAO
report also noted that the FDA reported at least nine cases where companies delayed or
failed to initiate a recall.94 In spite of the GAO criticism of USDA’s claim, USDA
officials continue to make the claim.95 This alleged success is credited to the “implicit
threat” of government enforcement, adverse publicity, and liability exposure.96 Given

89

USDA and FDA documented more than 3,700 food recalls from the mid-1980’s through 1999. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 7, at 33. In the last decade, the number and size of recalls have increased
dramatically, particularly Class I recalls. Michael Ollinger & Nicole Ballenger, Weighing Incentives for
Food Safety in Meat and Poultry, AMBER WAVES, April 2003, available at
http:www.ers.usda.gov/Amberwaves/April 03/Features/WeighingIncentives.htm.
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this success, mandatory recall authority is viewed unnecessary, since USDA and FDA
arguably have more than enough authority and leverage to require the recall of unsafe
food products.97
Advocates of “voluntary” recalls often prefer the term “cooperative” recall as
being more descriptive of the present system in which the recalling company and the
government agency work together to evaluate the product and risk and to recover that
product.98 The concern is that mandatory recalls would destabilize the current
cooperative regulatory environment and antagonize a private sector that is motivated to
prevent foodborne illnesses.99 Instead of a cooperative environment, the mandatory recall
system would generate an adversarial system marked by litigation and recrimination.100
Supporters of voluntary recall also view this “cooperative” recall approach as
consistent with the direction in which USDA and FDA are moving on the Hazard
Analysis and Critical Points System (HACCP).101 HACCP is heralded as critical to
government and industry joint efforts to ensure safe food.102 The idea behind HACCP is
that the government agency monitor and oversee a company’s performance and record
keeping.103 The logical extension is then made that since the current voluntary recall
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See National Meat Association, supra note 11, available at http://www.nmaonline.org/files/pr10-8.htm;
see also James H. Hodges, Meat and Poultry Regulatory Update, 54 FOOD & DRUG L. J. 459, 460 (1999).
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system is based on monitoring and oversight by government, it fosters the same spirit of
cooperation created by HACCP.104 This argument frames the overall “cooperative”
regulatory philosophy of USDA’s and FDA’s food safety responsibilities, but it leaves
unanswered the practical question: does a voluntary or mandatory food recall system best
remove unsafe food from commerce?
IV.
Criticism of Voluntary Recall Leading to Efforts to
Enact Mandatory Recall Legislation
Record-breaking recalls that have taxed the ability of the USDA and the recalling
companies to effectively remove unsafe meat from commerce have provoked stinging
criticism of the voluntary recall system from the media, consumer advocacy groups,
members of Congress, government officials, and the Office of Inspector General.105
These recalls were followed by proposed legislation that would have empowered USDA
and FDA with mandatory recall authority. All attempts to empower these agencies with
mandatory recall authority, however, have failed.
A.

Hudson Foods Recall of 1997

In 1997, Hudson Foods, Inc. (Hudson), an Arkansas-based meat processing
company, engaged in what became the nation’s largest beef recall.106 Hudson was the
fifth largest producer of chicken products and the twelfth largest producer of turkey

104

See FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 181-82.

105

The increase in the number and size of food recalls over the last several years is attributed to regulatory
changes, improved testing techniques, and an adeptness at identifying foodborne illness outbreaks. See
Ollinger and Ballenger, supra note 89, available at http:www.ers.usda.gov/Amberwaves/April
03/Features/WeighingIncentives.htm.
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See Rick Weiss, USDA Widens Investigation of Arkansas Meat Company, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 1997,
at A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/govt/admin/stories/glick081797.htm.
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products in the country and was a supplier of beef products to such major chains as
Burger King, Boston Market, and Wal-Mart.107 USDA learned of a problem from the
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment after it received reports of
illness from several Colorado consumers who had eaten Hudson hamburger patties in
early July of 1997.108 The meat was traced to a Nebraska plant owned by Hudson, where
quarter-pound hamburger patties were found contaminated with E. coli 0157:H7.109
Eventually, sixteen people became ill as a result of eating meat processed at the Hudson
plant.110
Relying on estimates by Hudson officials as to how much beef should be recalled,
the recall was limited to only 20,000 pounds, even though the plant produced 400,000
pounds per shift.111 Hudson officials112 told investigators that the contaminated lot
included 3,400 pounds of meat that had been “reworked” into 20,000 pounds of
hamburger the next day. Plant officials neglected to tell USDA investigators, however,
that meat continued to be reworked from one day to the next, so that once a contaminated
lot of meat got into the system, it would be mixed sequentially into all subsequent lots.
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See id.
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See United States Department of Agriculture, Press Release, Glickman Announces Hudson to Act on
USDA Recommendation to Close Nebraska Plant, Recall All Hudson Beef Products (Aug. 21, 1997),
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the Limits of USDA, DETROIT FREE PRESS, March 5, 1999, available at
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Once this information was disclosed and it was faced with the possibility of having its
plant closed down, Hudson began a voluntary recall that eventually included 25 million
pounds of potentially contaminated meat.113 The problem with the expanded recall,
however, was that much of the beef being recalled was already sold and presumably
consumed.114
1.

Response to Hudson Foods Recall

The Hudson Recall was viewed as an example of the breakdown of the
voluntary food recall system. Critics noted that USDA’s lack of recall authority
results in dangerous delays when companies such as Hudson question the extent or basis
for a recall and wait before acting.115 Consumer groups advocated that mandatory recall
authority be given to the government.116 Members of Congress also promoted mandatory
recall. United States Senator Tom Harkin (D-Iowa) stated at the time that “[m]andatory
recall authority puts the secretary in a stronger position to ensure that recalls occur on
time and that they cover all the contaminated products.”117 The USDA also issued a
press release stating that “[m]andatory notification will improve food safety because the
quicker USDA is notified of potentially contaminated meat and poultry, the quicker
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See Weiss, supra note 106, at A11.
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See Hamburger Recall Rises to 25 million Pounds, CNN INTERACTIVE, Aug. 21, 1997, available at
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American consumers can be protected.”118 Not everyone shared Senator Harkin’s and the
USDA’s views, however. Meat processors opposed mandatory recall, contending that it
is not needed since USDA could not cite any cases of companies refusing a recall request
and that there were adequate incentives for companies to recall unsafe food products.119
2.

Proposed Food Safety Enforcement Enhancement Act of 1997

The Food Safety Enforcement Enhancement Act of 1997 (FSEEA) was
introduced in direct response to the Hudson Foods recall.120 FSEEA authorized USDA to
require mandatory recall of adulterated or misbranded products when companies refused
to take voluntary action.121 Upon a finding by the Secretary of Agriculture that
reasonable probability exists that a meat or poultry product could endanger public health
if consumed, the Secretary would provide the company with an opportunity to cease
distribution and recall the product.122 If the company refused to take direct action, the
Secretary could then mandate a recall.123
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At the same time, FDA proposed analogous legislation known as the FDA Food
Safety Enforcement Act.124 Citing specific instances where companies failed to enforce a
voluntary recall,125 FDA proposed adding a new section to the FDCA that provided that
persons (other than consumers) who had a reasonable basis for believing that a food
article in interstate commerce might be adulterated would be required to notify the
Secretary of DHHS immediately.126 If the agency’s request for a voluntary recall were
rebuffed, the provision would allow the Secretary to order the recall.127
B.

ConAgra Recall of 2002

The next large-scale recall plagued with problems involved contaminated meat
processed and produced at the ConAgra plant in Greeley, Colorado.128 The plant is one
of the largest in the nation, employing about 2,500 people.129 The plant slaughters about
1.2 million cattle a year and processes, on average, about 350 cattle per hour.130
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See FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION, FDA TALK PAPER, FDA PROPOSES LEGISLATION TO IMPROVE
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Beginning in mid-June 2002, at least 46 people in 16 states became ill from
contaminated meat.131 ConAgra officials agreed to an initial voluntary recall of 354,200
pounds of ground beef produced in late May of that year.132 A subsequent FSIS review
of ConAgra records showed that beef product from the Greeley plant had been testing
positive for E. coli 0157:H7 as early as April 12, 2002, and as late as July 11, 2002. At
that time, the Greeley plant produced over 1 million pounds of beef a day.133
On July 18, 2002, because of the FSIS review, ConAgra decided that the recall
needed to be expanded to include over 18 million pounds of ground beef and beef trim.134
FSIS then issued a Notice of Intended Enforcement to ConAgra that allowed the
company three days to respond in writing to demonstrate why an inadequacy
determination should not be made against its sanitation standard operating procedure and
its HACCP system. Based on ConAgra’s response and planned corrective actions, the
Notice was held in abeyance, and the plant continued to operate from July through midNovember.135 On November 15, 2002, due to repeated zero-tolerance failures, FSIS
suspended inspection services, effectively closing the plant. The plant was allowed to
resume operations on November 20, 2002, after presenting FSIS with planned corrective
actions.136 Despite the recall, the majority of the beef was never returned.137
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2.

Response to ConAgra Recall

Although some in the meat industry viewed the ConAgra recall as too broad,138as
in the Hudson recall, USDA’s actions in the ConAgra recall received widespread
publicity and criticism in the press and from Congress.139 These critics noted that the
recall did not start until the end of June, even though contaminated product was first
produced in April, and that the recall had to be expanded because not all potentially
contaminated products had been identified until July.140
At the request of Congress, the Office of Inspector General (OIG) evaluated the
effectiveness of USDA’s management and oversight of the ConAgra product and on
September 30, 2003, issued an audit report.141 The report found that both ConAgra and
FSIS were unprepared for the recall because adequate controls and processes were not in
place to timely identify the source of the contaminated product or ensure that appropriate
enforcement actions would be taken.142 According to the OIG, FSIS “needs to reassess
its management and oversight of the recall process.”143 The report further noted that
FSIS failed to address problems that it was aware of prior to the recall. Before the recall,
FSIS issued multiple noncompliance notifications to ConAgra for fecal contamination of
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product but took no decisive enforcement action. Instead, it continually allowed
ConAgra to introduce superficial stopgap measures.144 Stopping short of recommending
mandatory recall authority,145 the report made thirty-one key recommendations for FSIS
to implement in its management of future recalls.146
FSIS deemed the IGO report irrelevant for four reasons.147 First, FSIS noted that
at the time of the report’s issuance it had already implemented changes in its recall
procedure.148 Second, FSIS did not view the conditions described in the report as
widespread but as isolated to a single plant.149 Third, FSIS had already eliminated a
program that exempted ConAgra and other meat processors from the FSIS’s own testing
program for E. coli.150 Fourth, federal inspectors now undergo training focused on public
health and systematically review plant-generated testing data.151
3.

Proposed Safer Meat, Poultry, and Foods Act of 2002

The Safer Meat, Poultry, and Foods Act of 2002 (Safer Act) was introduced in the
wake of the ConAgra recall152and addressed recall authority for both USDA and FDA
and enforcement generally. The Safer Act had three key parts: first, the authority to
144
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mandate the recall of meat, poultry, or food products, whether those be FDA-regulated
products or USDA-regulated products; second, the requirement that companies notify
USDA or FDA if they know their product is adulterated; and, third, authority to levy
fines for violations of food safety regulations.153 Despite strong support from consumer
groups,154 the Safer Act and the FSEEA met the same fate: they died in committee.155
The demise of these bills demonstrates a continual resistance to the government’s having
mandatory food recall authority.156
C.

The Logical Conundrum of Voluntary Recall Support

Despite their apparent persuasive appeal to lawmakers, the arguments in favor of
voluntary recall -- that the government already has sufficient enforcement power and that
mandatory recall authority will destabilize the cooperative nature of the voluntary recall
system157 -- are difficult to reconcile. If the government’s impressive array of
enforcement tools compel “voluntary” recalls, then mandatory recalls should not disrupt
the tone of the current regulatory environment since both systems share the common goal
of compelling the recall of unsafe food products. A more tenable criticism would be that
mandatory recall authority would be superfluous, not disruptive. Moreover, if a
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mandatory recall system can be devised that still allows and encourages voluntary recalls
by food companies, then the implicit threat that now compels voluntary recalls will
continue to compel companies to do so. The difference will be that a mandatory recall
system will render the implicit threat a real threat.
It is also difficult to reconcile the disparate treatment by the government in the
recall of food and non-food products. The government has mandatory recall authority for
numerous non-food products:158 the Consumer Protection Safety Commission (CPSC)
has the authority to order a recall unsafe consumer products;159 the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) has the authority to order a recall of dangerous chemicals;160
the FDA has the authority to order a recall for a number of medical products161 and for
one food product – infant formula;162 the National Highway Traffic System
Administration (NHTSA) of the U.S. Department of Transportation has the authority to
order a recall of motor vehicle products;163 and, the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has the
authority to order a recall of recreation boats and related equipment.164 The inconsistency
in the recall policy towards food and non-food products raises important policy questions.
Are unsafe food products less of a public health concern than dangerous consumer and
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other non-food products? Is there a rational public policy explanation as to why food
products should be singled out for exemption to mandatory recall authority?
V.
Devising a Sensible Mandatory Food Recall System
Given the reported shortcomings of the current voluntary recall system for food
products, it is worth evaluating the merits of a mandatory food recall system. This
section recommends the necessary components for an effective mandatory recall system
and lists the benefits derived from implementation of these components. This section
also examines the potential benefit of delegating food recall responsibility to a single
food safety agency, rather than two different government agencies.
A.

Necessary Components of Mandatory Recall System

In order to give teeth to the recall enforcement powers of FDA and USDA and
at the same time protect against the concern of government overreach,165 a mandatory
recall system needs to have both express powers and safeguards. Below are some of the
powers and safeguards that should be considered by policy makers.
1.

Express Powers

•

Express Authority to Mandate a Recall -- The first obvious tool is the

express authority to mandate the recall of food products, whether they are FDA or USDA
regulated products. If the agency finds that the food product is adulterated or misbranded
and that there is a reasonable probability that human consumption of such food presents a

165
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threat to public health, the agency should be provided the authority to stop the
distribution and recall the product.166
•

Fast-Track Recall – Consideration should be given to adopting a fast-

track-recall program for unsafe food products patterned after the CPSC fast-track
program. 167 The CPSC’s award winning fast-track program168 encourages companies to
recall dangerous products quickly and efficiently in a streamlined process.169 The CPSC
program eliminates some of the procedural steps in the traditional consumer goods recall
process, including the staff preliminary determination that the product contains a defect
that presents a substantial product hazard.170 A similar streamlined process should work
with the food industry.
•

Notification Requirement – All companies throughout the distribution

chain should be required to notify USDA or FDA if they know their food product is
adulterated or misbranded.171 Where the objective is to remove the unsafe food product
from commerce, it is imperative that companies are legally obligated to notify the
authorities when they discover a problem.
166

The “reasonable probability” standard for triggering the mandatory recall authority was included in both
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•

Authority to Levy Fines – In addition to mandatory recall authority,

USDA and FDA should be given authority to levy fines for violations of food safety
regulations.172 The amount of fines should be established to be fair to the infringing
company but significant enough to deter irresponsible conduct.173
•

Comprehensive Mandatory Recall Coverage -- USDA and FDA should

have the authority to order the recall of suspected food from the entire food distribution
system.174 This farm-to-table continuum would include food processors, meat packing
plants, restaurants, and grocery stores.
•

Emergency Powers for Acts of Terrorism -- There should be a provision

for immediate notice and recall if an act of terrorism is suspected to have rendered a food
product unsafe.175 In the event of a terrorism threat, certain safeguards enumerated in this
article may need to be suspended to protect public health. Acts of terrorism threatening
the safety of food is an increasing concern for at least two reasons.176 First, the
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States Department of Agriculture, Press Release, supra note 121, available at
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increasing number of entry points in the farm-to-table continuum increase the chances for
toxins and bacteria to be introduced into the food chain with relative ease.177 Second, a
lack of security and surveillance render many meat and vegetable processing and packing
plants susceptible to deliberate bio-attacks.178
•

Authority to Require Recall Plans – FSIS and FDA should be given

authority to require food companies to include in their HACCP plan the steps that would
be necessary to conduct an effective recall of food product.179 Ensuring that food
companies include plans for a recall in their HACCP plan would help maximize the
recovery of contaminated product.180
2.

Safeguards

•

Allowing for Voluntary Recall – A company should have the option of

voluntarily recalling its food product and notifying the public within the time and manner
prescribed by the agency.181 Although the Consumer Product Safety Act empowers the
CPSC to order product recalls, nearly all recalls administered by CPSC are still
voluntary.182 This is also true with other non-food products – notwithstanding mandatory
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See id. at 16.
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See id.
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Recommendation No. 12 in the GAO report following the ConAgra recall recommended that FSIS
should seek such authorizing legislation. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, supra note 4, at 42.
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See id. at 43.
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Providing the company the opportunity to voluntarily recall the adulterated or misbranded product was
specified in both the FSEEA and SAFER Act proposals. See id.
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See James T. O’Reilly, Product Recalls & the Third Restatement: Consumers Lose Twice from Defects
in Products and in the Restatement Itself, 33 U. MEM. L. REV. 883, 899 (Summer 2003).
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recall authority, companies nearly always engage in voluntary recall of substandard
products.183
•

Extension of Due Process -- Due process protection should be afforded to

the food companies.184 A company should be able to request an informal hearing before
an independent administrative judge when USDA or FDA issues a recall order. If the
company requests the hearing, the agencies should only require that the company stop
distributing the suspect food product and notify others to cease its distribution. The food
product would not be recalled until the hearing is held. The hearing would need to take
place as soon as possible after the issuance of the order.185 Allowing for an extra couple
of days for a hearing in the rare case of a dispute is a small delay compared to the
protracted delays experienced in the Hudson Foods and ConAgra recalls.
•

Limiting Liability – Limiting the liability of food companies who comply

with the government’s request for recall by giving them some immunity from civil
actions may provide another incentive for compliance. Food companies will already
have limited their liability, however, by quickly and efficiently recalling unsafe food
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See Pesticides: Topical and Chemical Fact Sheets, United States Environmental Protection Agency,
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opportunity for potential administrative abuse,” Hodges, supra note 96. Testimony to the Senate
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products.186Also, it may be difficult justify giving food companies favorable treatment
over non-food companies that timely and effectively recall unsafe products.
B.

Benefits of Mandatory Recall Authority

Implementation of these powers and safeguards will benefit consumers and food
companies. These benefits range from increasing the effectiveness of food recalls to
creating a more rational food recall system in the context of both domestic and
international policy.
•

Decreases Delay in Recalling Unsafe Food -- Mandatory notification and

mandatory recall authority should speed up the recall process.187 The sooner USDA and
FDA are notified of potentially contaminated food products, the quicker these agencies
can protect American consumers.188 Also, the implicit threat that compels recalls under
the voluntary recall system becomes a real and direct threat under a mandatory recall
system. In other words, mandatory recall gives the government additional leverage to
engage companies in a quick and effective recall of unsafe food products.189 This
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See United States Department of Agriculture, Press Release No. 0297.97, supra note 118, at available at
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See FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE, BACKGROUNDER, THE SAFETY OF AMERICAN MEAT AND
POULTRY (1997), available at http:www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/10/0346.
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Former Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman, stated:

We don’t have time for a protracted debate over how much
product should be recalled. We don’t have time for a snail’s
pace procedure to stop a plant’s production until they clean
up their act. One the experts make the determination that these
steps are necessary, we need to move quickly. Every minute
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time we deal with an outbreak.
Secretary Dan Glickman, Address at the USDA Headquarters, Aug. 29, 1997, available at
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leverage would avert the problem where a Hudson Foods or a ConAgra might agree to
voluntarily recall their unsafe food product, but minimize the size of the initial recall. A
type of CPSC fast-track recall program would further accelerate recalls of unsafe food.
•

Provides Insurance Policy Against the “Bad Apple” Company – If for

no other reason, mandatory recall authority is justified in its role as insurance against the
occasional non-cooperative company.190 Voluntary recalls may work for the most part;
however, there is always the possibility of a Hudson Foods or a ConAgra – a “bad apple”
company -- that refuses or is unable to cooperate fully in the recall of its unsafe food
product. Mandatory recall authority is needed to equip the government with the requisite
authority to force the non-compliant company to act without delay.
•

Protects Against Terrorist Acts – Given the concern of bioterrorism

threats to the safety of food in the United States,191 it is sensible that the government
agencies charged with the safety of the nation’s food supply – USDA and FDA – should
have the authority to mandate the immediate recall of unsafe food.192
•

Preserves Voluntary Recalls – As already noted in this article, it is likely

that most companies will opt for voluntary recall, as do most companies who fall under
the jurisdiction of the CPSC and other government agencies with authority to order a
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See United States Department of Agriculture, Press Release, supra note 121, available at
http://www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/08/0298. See also FOOD SAFETY AND INSPECTION SERVICE,
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authorities to protect the American food supply, mandatory food recall authority is essential to dealing with
potential terrorist threats against the food supply).
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recall of non-food products.193 If this is the case, mandatory recall will occur only in
those rare instances where a company wants to contend with FDA or USDA or delay or
refuse to meet a voluntary recall request. This probable outcome means that the
cooperative enforcement environment between government and private industry will
continue.
•

Enhances Consumer Confidence in Food – An important function of an

effective recall is to maintain consumer confidence in the United States food supply.
Consumers are generally surprised to discover that the government does not have the
authority to mandate the recall of unsafe food.194 Large-scale recalls that are mishandled
by companies and government damage consumer confidence in the food supply.195 It is
reasonable to believe that consumers will feel more assured in the safety of the United
States food supply if government has the authority to mandate recall when a serious
foodborne illness problem occurs.
•

Aligns Incentives to Protect Consumers from Unsafe Food – The

decision by a food company to engage in a purely voluntary recall is made when the
193

See Cassie Orban, Student Note, The Product Recall Process: Mechanics and Shortcomings, 12 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 311, 320-21 (2000).
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Former Secretary of Agriculture, Dan Glickman stated:
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in the Food Supply, SCI. AM., Nov. 3, 1997.
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expected costs of the recall are less than the costs of the implicit threat of liability,
negative publicity, or regulatory action.196 This “costs” analysis does not involve,
however, full consideration of the social costs – the harm to public health.197 Giving the
government the authority to mandate recalls will more fully allow government agencies
to account for social costs and cause food companies to internalize these social costs
when making safety decisions that effect the probability of recall.198
•

IncreasesScope and Depth of Recall – The development of traceability

systems is enabling food companies to track product distribution and target recall
activities.199 By giving the government mandatory recall coverage, the chances of
removing unsafe food with the advent of new traceability systems from all levels of the
food chain are increased considerably.
•

Reduces Liability Exposure of Food Companies – Foodborne illnesses

expose food companies to liability exposure under state product liability laws.200 Several
law and consulting firms now specialize in foodborne illness lawsuits.201 Speeding up the
recall process leads to less contaminated food consumed by consumers, which in turn
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leads to a reduction of liability exposure for companies.202 When faced with the
prospects of an unsafe food product, companies have a conflict of interest: they want to
remove contaminated product from commerce while at the same time not taint their brand
image.203 This dilemma may cause a company to engage in a recall, but one that is
smaller and slower than is necessary to protect public health, such as the ConAgra recall.
Mandatory recall authority helps remove the pressure of this conflict: the food company
will be more compelled to act quickly and efficiently, thus lessening its liability
exposure.204
•

Standardizes Government’s Recall Policies – Mandatory food recall

authority standardizes the government’s recall policies and practices, creating a more
rational domestic public health network. For example, it makes little sense to give the
government the authority to order the recall of 125,000 detachable plugs on power
adapters, as it did in 2003, where there were reported twelve plugs breaking open but no
injuries 205and not the authority to order the recall of hamburger contaminated with
deadly E. coli 0157:H7 bacteria.
•

Creates Food Recall Policy Consistent with International Trading

Partners – Countries globally are intensifying their efforts to improve food safety in
response to increasing food safety problems and consumer expectations.206 Mandatory
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2004), at 25.

206

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, FACT SHEET ON FOOD SAFETY AND FOODBORNE ILLNESS, NO. 237
(January 2002), available at http://www.who.int/inf-fs/en/fact237.html.

37

recall is an enforcement tool used by the major trading partners to the United States to
ensure the removal of unsafe food products.207 Although this fact alone is not a
compelling reason for mandatory food recall authority, it does suggest that the prevailing
global view in an ever-increasing global food economy is that mandatory authority is
imperative.
•

Positions USDA and FSIS as Public Health Agencies – FDA and FSIS

within USDA are viewed as public health agencies.208 The credibility of FDA and FSIS
in fulfilling this role depends on how well they protect public health.209 Having the
ultimate authority to cause the removal of unsafe food in a timely and effective manner
promotes the credibility of these agencies.210

207

See FSIS, BACKGROUNDER supra note 188, available at
http:www.usda.gov/news/releases/1997/10/0346.
208

Due to the responsibilities of the USDA to market meat, the claim has been made that USDA is not by
its nature a public health agency. This observation is generally made in support of a single, separate
regulatory food safety agency. See Aparna Surendran, Meat Inspection Suffers Because Industry,
Government at Odds, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, June 4, 2003, available at
http:www.centredaily.com/mld/centredaily/news/6010859.htm (remarks by Carol Tucker Foreman, Head
of the Consumer Federation of America).
209

As stated by a USDA official, “recalls are a critical tool for us to carry out our public health mission.”
FSIS Public Meeting, supra note 2, at 10.

210

At the time of the GAO report of 2000, which criticized the recall process of USDA and FDA, the GAO
reported USDA’s position that it needed mandatory recall authority to improve food safety and has
supported proposed legislation. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, supra note 18, at 20. Dr. Catherine
Woteki, former Undersecretary for Food Safety, stated that the USDA “believe that in order to truly protect
the public health, USDA needs the authority to mandate a recall when voluntary efforts fail.” Catherine
Woteki, Address, Washington D.C. (Oct. 5, 1998), available at
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OA/speeches/1998/cw_recall.htm.

38

C.

Single Agency to Administer Recalls

A recent GAO report criticizes the fragmented government agency approach to
food safety.211 The report notes that food safety in the United States is governed by a
complex system of thirty food safety laws, twelve federal agencies to administer these
laws, and fifty interagency agreements to govern the combined food safety
responsibilities of these twelve agencies.212 The report concludes that a single
independent food safety agency is needed to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
the current food safety system.213
The report specifically criticizes the current dual agency responsibility over food
recalls.214 The report finds that having both the FSIS and FDA involved in the recall of
unsafe food is confusing and nonsensical in many cases.215The report notes that with the
recent BSE-infected animal case found in Washington state, FSIS conducted a recall of
meat distributed in markets in six states; however, had the meat been used, for example,
in canned soups containing less than two percent meat, FDA, not FSIS, would have
worked with the companies to recall these foods.216
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VI.
Conclusion
As stated by a USDA official in the aforementioned December 12, 2002 public
meeting, “the time certainly is right to examine our recall process.”217 Both sides in the
debate over whether the government should have the authority for the recall of unsafe
food products share a common goal: unsafe food products should be removed from
commerce effectively and quickly. Both sides are far apart, however, in determining the
appropriate role of government in the recall process. Proponents of the current voluntary
food recall system are quick to point to the past successes of recalling unsafe food from
commerce, and express concern about government intrusion and overreach. Proponents
of a mandatory food recall system are quick to point to the past highly publicized failures
of large-scale voluntary recalls and the disparate treatment of food products from nonfood products subject to mandatory recall authority.
Lost in the debate is how a mandatory recall system with the proper components
and safeguards can be a sensible and minimalist approach to improving the current recall
system that for the most part works fairly well. Voluntary recalls would continue to be
the norm, as government and the food industry would continue to work together to ensure
that unsafe food is removed effectively and quickly from commerce. The change would
be the additional leverage given to government to compel a recall. With a heightened
sense of concern for food safety in an era of terrorist threats and the changing nature of
food production and distribution, giving the government additional leverage to compel
the recall of unsafe food products makes sense for the protection of consumers and for
the well-being of the food industry.
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